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although the theoretical background of edmund husserl and James gibson respectively 
could be hardly more distant, their accounts of perception show high compatibility. This 
compatibility does not extend to the ontological status of percepts. We propose here a short 
contrastive analysis of gibson’s and husserl’s theses on the relation between perception 
and reality.  We dwell on three restrictions formulated by gibson with regard respectively 
to the nature of memory, imagination and the biological meaning of affordances. These 
restrictions, which are functional to gibson’s direct realism, are then criticised in the light of 
relevant husserlian analyses. finally, we suggest a phenomenological line of inquiry able to 
address and resettle the ordinary notion of perceptual reality.
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edmund husserl’s account of the constitution of perceptual objects can be 
roughly set forth along the following lines:
1. Percepts are genetically constituted over time through sensuous 
experience: we learn to perceive (hua i, 112).
2. Percepts are always posited as independently existent objects. that 
the existence as wholes is posited is displayed, among other things, by 
the phenomenon of adumbrations (abschattungen): perceptual things 
are wholes that are betokened by present impressions (hua Xi, 3).
3. Perceptual objects are apperceived in the wake of just unfolded 
impressions (retentions) and in sight of immediately expected 
impressions (protentions): apperceptions are teleological syntheses 
providing unitariness and intertemporal identity to percepts. 
this means, among other things, that we cannot conceive of the 
constitution of objects without reference to a motivational dimension 
(huamat viii, 260).
4. Perceptual objects are 1) transcendent entities and 2) 
spatiotemporal determinations. these two features do not coincide.
4.1 Something is “transcendent” if it is recognised (intended) 
as subsistent beyond and independently of subjective activity. 
this means that transcendent entities are intentionally posited as 
subsistent irrespective of intentional acts (huamat viii, 52).
4.2 the transcendent character of a perceptual object is not 
to be equated with its “external” nature. Something can be 
independently subsistent without having spatial determinations: 
pain, dizziness or logical truths are recognised as independent 
on my intentional acts, but they need not come “from without”. 
on the other hand, we can imagine externally existent objects 
without them being transcendent (See hua iv, 131 et seq.).
5. the existence of perceptual objects as spatiotemporal 
determinations depends on kinaestheses, which are supramodal 
sensations of motion. Kinaestheses can produce the cross-modal 
synthesis needed for the constitution of spatiotemporal objects since 
they inhere in the living body, which is a transmodal sentient unity (hua 
Xvi, 154 et seq.).
6. Finally, perception, while obviously fallible, represents the first 
source of phenomenal evidence, which can be refuted only by contrast 
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with further perceptual evidence. First and foremost perception 
must be taken to be conducive to truthful judgments.
these phenomenological theses could be argued for through an exegesis 
of husserl’s texts and/or by autonomous phenomenological analysis. this 
is not the way we want to go in the following pages: here we would like to 
illustrate interest and validity of those theses by contrast with the well-
known analysis of perception provided by J. J. gibson. this contrastive 
analysis of Husserlian and Gibsonian theses is justified by the fact that many 
ideas of the two authors seem highly compatible, while their ontological 
frameworks appear to be clearly at odds: gibson’s naturalistic realism 
and husserl’s antinaturalism seem to be incompatible. Furthermore this 
comparative effort is motivated by the current revival of gibsonian theses in 
the framework of contemporary attempts to reconcile phenomenology and 
cognitive sciences (see noë 2004, 104 et seq.).
let us set forth gibson’s main arguments with particular reference to their 
treatment in The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems (1983, 1st ed. 1966), 
where all key concepts relevant to our aims are to be found. gibson’s core 
thesis is that perception is a way to grasp real environmental information, and 
does not consist in imposing order onto chaotic sensations. Perception is not an 
order imposed by the subject on an alleged chaos of sensations, since this 
would amount to making of perceptual reality an imaginational product: 
if perception was interpreted as transformation of unordered sensations 
into perceptual units, this would call upon a subjective projecting activity, 
such that perception would turn into imagination posited as real (gibson 
1983, 227-228). this view, which threatens to make of perception a “grand 
illusion”, is opposed by the idea that subject’s activity looks for and obtains 
useful information from the environment (ibid. 31). the protagonists of 
perception are not sensory receptors but sense organs, by which gibson 
means the mobile parts of the sensory system (ibid. 40). Percepts are not just 
received, but they are actively obtained by the perceiver, who brings to light 
percepts by mapping her own exploratory sensorimotor activity (ibid. 31). 
this means that the “perceptual system has to be propriosensitive as well 
as exterosensitive” (ibid. 252), so that the continuum of sensations coming 
from muscular activation and modal feedback can blend into environmental 
information. gibson’s use of the term “kinaesthesis” is more restricted than 
husserl’s one, however, their accounts of the kinaesthetic constitution of 
percepts are highly compatible (See hua Xvi). in this sense gibson’s work 
can be regarded both as an illustration and as an updated completion of 
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husserl’s inquiry. but when it comes to tackle the nature of the connection 
between perception and reality, the two authors clearly part ways.
according to gibson, environmental light intrinsically brings information 
relative to visual surfaces in the same way in which the sound of a bell 
informs us of the bell and the odor of cheese of cheese (ibid. 187). the core 
idea is that environmental light (which is not just physically available light) 
is to be conceived as a sequence of optic arrays centred in the perceiver’s eye 
and manifesting invariant optical transformations. in other terms, by actively 
exploring the environment, the sensorimotor feedback of eyes, head and 
overall locomotion brings forth patterns of environmentally available 
optical thresholds. Such patterns are the expression of invariants akin to 
the ones investigated by topological transformations (ibid. 202), according to 
which any two proximate points in a geometrical figure can be associated 
by a function to two proximate points in classes of different figures. 
topological transformations (especially continuous ones) show cases (e.g., 
perspectival transformations) where one can derive a figure from another 
according to a function. yet, the reference to topological transformations 
is more a suggestive example than an actual solution of the problem of 
perceptual identity through sensory change: we can produce a continuous 
transformation of the image of an apple into the one of a horse, but this 
does not support the perceptual identity of apples and horses yet. indeed, 
gibson himself is uncertain about how strict the reference to topological 
transformations should be: they do not actually express anything more than 
a suggestion to look at optical invariants.
gibson’s realism essentially consists in the idea that optical (and other 
modal) invariants represent environmental information, which gives direct 
access to reality in itself. What is meant here by “reality” is not as clear as 
one might wish, though. apparently gibson feels obliged to downplay and 
possibly discard any role played by subjective acts of synthesis. We may 
appreciate what gibson has in mind if we notice that he tries: (i) to minimize 
the role to be attributed to memory in perception; (ii) to drop any reference 
to imagination in perception; and (iii) to conceive all relational properties of 
things (affordances) as elements belonging to the world in itself.
(i) as we said, in order to downplay all irreducibly subjective 
contributions to perceptual recognition, gibson minimizes the role 
played by all non-actual experience in actual perception. however, when 
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the relevant non-actual experience is memory, it is hard to see how one 
could avoid referring to a memory function while relying on a model of 
perception dependent on diachronic sensorimotor sampling (conducive 
to invariants). in order to detect invariance across change you must rely 
on the availability to consciousness of bygone impressions, otherwise 
you cannot discern what stays and what flows. Indeed, Gibson at 
first downplays all reference to memory, but ends up stating that his 
criticism targets just the idea of memory as a storage (ibid. 262 et seq.). 
yet, if this is the case, it becomes unclear how this rejection of the role 
of memory could ever reduce the weight attributed to subjective acts 
of synthesis. after all husserl’s notion of retention may be read precisely 
as a memory function which is irreducible to any storage model, while 
being essential to a synthetic institution of percepts. 
(ii) gibson wants to avoid the idea that our perceived world is an 
imaginational construction based on sensations. however, this cannot 
mean that perception can do without any subjective activity, since we 
need something that brings us from sensorimotor samples to unitary 
percepts. as husserl extensively shows, perceptual objects can be 
acknowledged only by “completing” current impressional evidence; 
it may be inappropriate to use the label “imagination” for such 
completing activity (and indeed husserl avoids it), but the reference to 
subjective activity is inevitable. here the crucial point of contrast is 
between the necessary reference of husserl’s account to a motivational 
(and teleological) dimension implicit in perceptual constitution and the 
resistance of gibsonian realism to any such traits. gibson describes the 
required perceptual synthesis as if it were a kind of pure intuition of 
mathematical invariants, which underlie sensory samples:
“The sampling of the world by locomotion, the sampling of the head’s field 
by eye-turning, and the detailed sampling of parts of this field by foveal 
exploration, are all similar in one respect. the set of sequential samples is a 
unit in the sense that it comprises a mathematical group.” (gibson 1983, 261)
but what does it mean that the “set of sequential samples is a unit in the 
sense that it comprises a mathematical group”? it seems to say that the real 
unity of the percept depends on the invariance of a mathematical function, 
which ideally underlies a sensorimotor transformation. but this point is 
unclear. in fact, there are countless mathematical functions which can 
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define topological transformations without supporting any objectual 
identity. Should we specify that, in the infinite set of all possible functions 
defining geometrical invariances, human eyes pick up special subsets of 
invariants? Plausibly those invariants that “humans are interested in”? but 
this means that the potential availability of an underlying mathematical 
function is at most a condition of possibility for synthesis, not the ground that 
actualizes synthesis. in order to obtain perceptual units we must apparently 
rely on motivational ground, as husserl taught us.
(iii) one of the most original contributions by gibson is his theory 
of affordances. by affordance gibson means any potential of action 
inherent in the environment; such potentials are sensorimotor relations, 
which are immediately apprehended as intuitive units (gibson 1983, 23; 
see gibson 1986, 127-145). this means that we have direct access to the 
graspability of the stick, and need not first acknowledge the objective 
attributes of the stick and then infer the relations between those 
attributes and our sensorimotor powers. From a phenomenological 
point of view the notion of affordance can be precious since it captures 
a universal character of experience: what we apprehend is primarily what 
fits subjective embodied powers. and, as we will see, this implies that 
objective features are available only as qualified subsets of those primary 
subjective apprehensions. but gibson insists in conceiving of affordances 
as something that somehow belongs to the thing in itself: they 
represent immediately accessible environmental information. here the 
ground becomes slippery and the thesis ambiguous.  
on the one hand, it is right to emphasize that “environmental information” 
is not “made up” by the perceiver, but belongs to the thing as perceived. on the 
other hand, we cannot go all the way down to the statement that affordances 
“exist independently” of perception (i.e., sensorimotor apprehension in 
general) (gibson 1983, 274). gibson is right in saying that affordances are not 
created by cerebral reorganization (ibid. 273), but he seems to believe that the 
only alternative is to attribute them to the thing in itself. before opposing 
mind and matter along traditional lines, we must take seriously the idea that 
our primal access to reality is phenomena, especially perceptual phenomena, 
which come to existence, as it were, at the “meeting point” between 
embodied capabilities and sensuous transcendence. this perspective, while 
compatible with the notion of affordance, is foreign to gibson: he conceives 
of the very relation between subject and object in objective terms. this 
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position is of course nothing but full-fledged scientific naturalism: subjects, 
their properties and experiences are essentially nothing but their objective 
spatiotemporal embodiments, and if something does not fit this reduction it 
is either downplayed (e.g., qualia as epiphenomena) or referred to a scientific 
reduction to come.
gibson’s naturalism does not argue for a reduction of cognitive variables 
to the physical but maintains the original nature of biological features: this 
is the ontological framework underlying the most innovative aspects of 
gibson’s account, like the immediate apprehension of affordances and the 
irreducibility of environmental information. gibson needs to separate 
the “ecological” (biological) meaning of light, environment, information, 
etc. from their physical meaning, since the physical value of those notions 
cannot account for perception (e.g., physically there is no such a thing as 
figure-ground contrast). in a strict physical sense no light modulation is more 
salient than any other, and luminous invariants are no more significant 
than ever-changing polychromies. From a phenomenological perspective we 
could say that physical reality, that is, the range of all potentially detectable 
physical units is no unitary reality and so much the less is perceptual reality. 
gibson is perfectly aware of the necessity to introduce a selective principle 
conducive to perceptual units, but he wants to do it while staying at the 
naturalistic level, and this is done by granting priority to biological reality. 
But when we depart from mainstream scientific naturalism, which relies 
on physicalism, realism loses much of its plainness. is gibson telling us that 
the cognitively accessible world is the one compatible with our biological 
interests? but this would amount more to Uexküll’s (2010) idea of umwelt, 
than to customary realism: we would not refer to the world in itself, but to 
the biologically meaningful world. and here we run into an inescapable 
epistemological aporia: we cannot provide statements of biological content 
from the outside of biological functions. the “ecological” nature of gibson’s 
realism does not seem rationally discernible from a vision where Uexküll 
could join Schopenhauer: we experience only what complies with our 
instincts. as Uexküll’s well-known example goes, the tick reacts to the 
odor of sebaceous follicles and to the temperature of blood, without them 
necessarily entering into any unitary picture (reality) (Uexküll 2010, 53 et 
seq.). Would this still be realism?
a husserlian kind of perceptual realism can be provided by noting that 
perception is just never bypassable for our cognitive access to the world: we 
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may build technological devices able to refine and amplify our perceptual 
powers, but we cannot access reality (whatever it may be) without relying on 
perception. From this point of view perception is constitutively conducive 
to reality, while the reality to which we can refer is given only through an 
embodied motivational orientation.
the reference to biological variables is essential to gibson in order to 
introduce in the perceptual process a principle of selection (saliency, interest) 
which would be unavailable at the physical level. and using a natural 
science like biology as ontological framework may give the impression 
that we can do without subjective traits in accounting for our perceptual 
access to reality. but this is an illusion, since biology is not life: biology is a 
rational construct, which presupposes and rests on living interests. We must 
recognise in the first-person essential features of life in order to gain access 
to biological categorizations.
it must be stressed that no motivational (and intentional) features can be 
recognised without reference to first-person accounts: ends, drives, and 
intentional acts in general are essentially not spatiotemporal facts; they 
may “supervene” on spatiotemporal embodiments, but nothing in their sole 
spatiotemporal determinations captures their motivational/intentional 
character. this is a simple, but discriminating point for husserlian 
phenomenology in contrast with all naturalistic approaches: for husserl, 
objective accounts are and cannot be anything but qualified subsets of first-
person experiences (phenomena); this means that first-person experiences are 
not peculiar exceptions in the ontological sphere, but the only possible basis 
for truthful statements on what there is. 
We use the (non-husserlian) expression first-person experience to convey 
the idea that the epistemic priority of phenomena is not a priority 
of “introspection”, but of experience “within the limits in which it is 
presented” (hua iii, 52). Phenomena for husserl are not “mine” (they do 
not belong to any specific individual) and are not “internal” (they are not 
specifically seen by the “mind’s eye”, but mostly by ordinary eyes, ears, etc.). 
Phenomena are just all first-person manifestations describable while suspending 
any thesis on the ontological status (reality) of what is described. Phenomena 
are first-person experiences which can be never “bypassed” in favour of 
objective data. e.g., we may grant that the perception of “red” objectively 
corresponds to a wave-length of about 700 nanometres, but the experience 
of red is necessary to reach that objective conclusion, while the allegedly 
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objective conclusion is contingent on the experience of red. (in fact, it turns 
out that the equivalence between wave-length and colour is not generally 
true (thompson 1995, 82 et seq.)). this means that the phenomenological 
vindication of the role of consciousness does not involve any dichotomic 
contrast with objectivity, since the latter is unthinkable without the former. 
but this implies also that all efforts by objective accounts to keep away from 
the dimension of experienced consciousness are at best misleading. gibson’s 
analyses are compatible with phenomenological accounts up to the point 
where he fears that his naturalistic realism could be threatened. When this 
happens, he tries to take distance from all concepts of subjective flavour 
like “memory” and “imagination”, but actually he can distance himself only 
from some discredited versions of them. both husserl and gibson maintain 
that perception provides access to reality. gibson tries to argue the point 
by grounding perception on a multi-layered explanation where percepts 
are truthful because of biological (evolutionary) reasons: we detect the 
environmental information that is useful for the biological beings that we 
are. For husserl this way to argue for the intrinsic link between perception 
and reality would be nonsensical, because it would amount to supporting 
the ground with what is grounded on it: objective theories of biological 
or physical nature may or may not be true, but in any case their relative 
truthfulness depends on the assumption that perception is conducive to reality, 
otherwise no corroboration or refutation of the relevant theories could ever 
take place. as husserl argues, perception can indeed deceive. but this can 
be brought to evidence only by further perceptual content, never by theories 
unrestrained by perception. husserl’s “realism” implies at the same time 
that no attribute of reality can be provided without (implicit or explicit) 
reference to embodied consciousness.
Finally, we must notice that there is a problem essential to perceptual 
realism, which is left unmet by the gibsonian approach. Perceptual reality 
is characterized by cross-modal identity: our tactile, visual and acoustic 
percepts must provide coherent information and when this is not the case, 
we know that we have to do with illusion of a kind. if the stick in water 
appears visually bent, but tactilely straight, we speak of illusion (perceptual 
unreality). Here two distinct problems rise: the first one concerns the nature 
of the common ground (“code”) where different modalities must be able to 
interact in order to be considered coherent (or not) with each other. this 
question is not properly answered either by gibson or by husserl, and we 
will overlook it here (but for a possible phenomenological answer see Zhok 
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2012, 97 et seq.). the second problem concerns the meaning of the relevant 
judgments of coherence (or not).
this second question concerns the very nature of the cross-modal reality 
to be found. regardless of the problem of what is in common between 
modalities, the essential question from a husserlian point of view would 
sound: what is the meaning of the apparently self-evident assumption that 
reality is the locus where all sensuous modalities agree? Why do we judge 
that modal information which is discordant (the stick bent in water) signals 
unreality? here we are interested only in the general sense of husserl’s 
answer, because of its incompatibility with any obvious naturalistic 
realism: phenomenologically, reality is not a fact, but a tèlos, and precisely 
a constitutive, immanent, non arbitrary tèlos (not to be mixed up with an 
Aristotelian final cause). 
To briefly illustrate this point, let us consider the well-known experimental 
findings on the perceptual adaptation to inverted glasses. After wearing 
glasses that invert the direction of rays coming to the retina, the perceiver 
suffers a disruption of the ordinary cross-modal associations and a 
consequent perceptual breakdown (Kohler 1964, 8 et seq.). this disruption is 
gradually overcome through sensorimotor exploration, so that the perceiver 
comes back to the same unitary organization of perception available before 
wearing the glasses. at the end of the process of adaptation the actual 
stimuli are physically different from the ones available before wearing the 
glasses, while the perceptual content is the same. but such an end of the 
process can be an end in the sense of “conclusion” only insofar as it is an end 
in teleological sense: the process stabilizes when we reach perceptual reality. 
We must deal with sensuous transcendence, but it is not the world in itself 
that impose reality on us: it is we who actively look for sensuous concordance 
in the field of sensuous transcendence. And such motivated sensuous 
unitariness is what we primarily call reality.
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